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INTRODUCTION
Poor people do not create trusts. But for people with money, the
trust is a time-honored device for accomplishing a wide variety of
unobjectionable, and even laudatory, goals. Trusts enable their settlors
to provide for minor children or grandchildren, ensure competent
management of wealth, and account for unanticipated changes in family
circumstances. But many settlors use trusts to accomplish other goals—
creditor protection and tax minimization—that come at a social cost:
creditors do not get paid and other taxpayers pick up the fiscal slack.
None of this is new. Trusts owe their origin to medieval efforts to
avoid taxation. 1 They have routinely been used as a creditor-protection
device for more than a century. 2 In recent decades, however, trustees
and trust lawyers have lobbied, with increasing success, for statutes that
increase the ability of wealthy settlors to avoid taxes and creditors. To
take one example, in response to the growth of offshore trusts, 3 a
number of state legislatures have authorized “asset protection trusts”
that enable settlors to shelter their own assets from creditors. 4 To take
another, many states have abolished or modified the rule against
perpetuities, in large measure to enable trust settlors to minimize estate
tax burdens. 5
1 See J.M.W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 1215–1540, at 132–33 (1968)
(noting that uses, the predecessor of modern trusts, enabled landowners to evade feudal
incidents); AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 2 (rev. 2d and 3d ed. 2016) (same).
2 In the nineteenth century, American courts began recognizing “spendthrift trusts,” which
placed trust assets beyond the reach of the creditors of the trust beneficiary. See, e.g., Broadway
Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882) (enforcing spendthrift trusts, and concluding that
the trust was not unfair to creditors because creditors are in a position to ascertain the nature of
the beneficiary’s interest, and therefore not to lend to a beneficiary whose resources are tied up
in a spendthrift trust); see also Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726 (1875) (holding that
spendthrift trusts are not unfair to creditors).
3 For discussion of the growth of offshore trusts in the 1990s, see James T. Lorenzetti, The
Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme, 102 COM. L.J. 138, 140–43 (1997);
Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1994).
4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570–3572 (West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 166.040 (West 2013). See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race
to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000).
5 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 34.27.075 (West 2007) (“The common law rule against
perpetuities does not apply in this state.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.025(1) (West 2007) (stating
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The settlors of many older trusts (and their lawyers) did not always
anticipate how much success the lobbyists would have in obtaining
these benefits. As a result, the trusts they created cannot take full
advantage of changes in the legal regime. Over the last twenty years or
so, trustees and trust lawyers have hit upon a solution: trust decanting.
Why not allow a trustee to “decant” trust assets from one vessel (the old
trust) into a second vessel (a new trust that takes advantage of modern
innovations), all in the name of better effectuating the presumed intent
of the trust settlor? Frequently, of course, that presumed intent is
avoiding taxes and creditor claims.
Decanting is not the only mechanism for modifying a trust to
accomplish the settlor’s objectives. In recent decades, courts have
become far more willing to modify a trust’s terms to ensure that a
settlor’s material purpose is effectuated or to adapt to circumstances not
anticipated by the settlor. Decanting, however, shifts the power to
modify from disinterested judges with an eye on the public interest to
compensated trustees who, in some cases, stand to derive financial
benefit from the decision to decant.
One state legislature after another has embraced the decanting
concept, 6 although the statutory details are not always the same. The
Uniform Law Commissioners have recently approved the Uniform
Trust Decanting Act. That act emphasizes that a decanting statute
“provides flexibility by statutorily expanding discretion already granted
to the trustee to permit the trustee to modify the trust either directly or
by distributing its assets to another trust.” 7
Trust decanting has some clear benefits. When the drafting lawyer
has made a mess of the trust, decanting will sometimes enable the
trustee to correct mistakes and to clarify ambiguities without the need
for costly judicial proceedings. Decanting also enables trustees of some
that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to interests in trust). See generally Robert H.
Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359 (2005) (“The driving force behind the
erosion of the Rule was not a careful reconsideration of the ancient common law policy against
perpetuities, but rather a 1986 reform to the federal tax code.”). The ALI has declared the
perpetual trust movement ill-advised. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see also Lawrence W.
Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 529, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975117.
6 In 1992, New York was the first state to enact a decanting statute. See Act of July 24,
1992, ch. 591, 1992 N.Y. Laws 3520 (codified as amended at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 10-6.6 (McKinney 2002)). The New York statute has since been amended. Other states have
enacted decanting statutes much more recently. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1 (West
2012) (subsequently repealed in favor of a version of the Uniform Trust Decanting Act, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-779.1–779.25 (2017))
7 UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
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older trusts to avoid investment inefficiencies that were not wellunderstood when their trusts were drafted. In emphasizing these
benefits, the proponents of decanting have largely ignored two
significant issues raised by the decanting movement.
The first issue is whether a statutory grant of decanting power,
when the trust instrument does not authorize decanting, conflicts with
basic principles of testamentary freedom. Although the justification for
decanting rests on its potential to effectuate the settlor’s purposes, it is
not always easy for a trustee to determine the intent of a now-dead trust
settlor when the settlor did not memorialize that intent in the trust
instrument. The trustee, who may have been selected for reasons other
than intimate knowledge of the settlor’s wishes, will not always be in an
optimal position to assess that intent. Moreover, the trustee’s own
interests may cloud its judgment about whether to decant.
The second issue, which is in some tension with the first, is
whether decanting enables trustees to effectuate the settlor’s intent
when, as a matter of policy, there is no good reason for exalting the
settlor’s presumed intent. The legal system has long tolerated the
distributional inequities generated by trusts in large measure because of
the incentives the trust device provides to potential settlors: people with
wealth and talent may engage in more productive activity, and may
partake in less frivolous consumption, if they know they can provide for
future generations without worrying about the debt collector or the tax
collector. But even if we assume that these efficiency considerations
outweigh distributional inequities, is there any reason to enable trust
beneficiaries to extract newly available benefits that could not possibly
have influenced the trust settlor?
This Article addresses these questions. After Part I’s survey of trust
law reforms that provided the impetus for the decanting movement,
Part II explores the origins, justifications, and mechanics of trust
decanting. Parts III and IV, the heart of the Article, establish that the
extraordinary breadth of decanting statutes risks frustrating the intent
of settlors and enables trustees to impose external costs without
generating commensurate social benefits. Part V concludes with a
discussion of the potential obstacles to reform.
I. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF TRUST LAW
A trust can be an efficient mechanism for accomplishing the trust
settlor’s objectives. At the same time, absent appropriate constraints, a
trust can impose social costs on people who are not parties to the trust.
Much of the history of trust law reflects the efforts of courts and
legislatures to obtain the benefits trusts can create while minimizing the
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external costs trusts impose. The trust is a direct descendant of the
“use,” a popular tax-and-creditor-avoidance device in feudal England.8
Although statutes enacted in the fourteenth century made uses less
attractive as creditor-avoidance devices, 9 uses remained popular for
avoiding feudal incidents for an additional 150 years. But the spread of
uses was costly to the English Crown and, in 1535, Parliament, at the
urging of Henry VIII, enacted the Statute of Uses, 10 which reduced the
value of uses as a tax-and-creditor-avoidance device. 11 The Statute of
Uses, however, did not mark the end of trusts. First, the statute by its
terms applied only to real property, leaving trusts of personalty
untouched. 12 Second, common law courts construed the statute to be
inapplicable to “active” trusts—those where the trustee had active duties
rather than serving as a mere figurehead for the holder of beneficial
title. 13
The trust survived and thrived because it served purposes other
than tax avoidance and creditor protection. First, it allowed a property
owner to ensure that the family wealth would be managed by a person
with some financial acumen. 14 Second, the trust provided an efficient
mechanism for dividing ownership over time. The other alternative for
dividing ownership over time—the legal life estate—was an inefficient
vehicle for holding title to land because no one person would have
authority to transfer the land even when transfer made sense for the
8 See BEAN, supra note 1, at 137 (noting that English landowners employed uses to keep
their lands “out of the clutches of creditors”); id. at 132–33 (noting emergence of uses as a
device to avoid feudal incidents). English common law obligated landowners to make a money
payment, known as a “relief,” to the lord of the land when land descended to an heir. HESS,
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 1, § 2. This system encouraged landowners to avoid having land
descend. The landowner could accomplish that result by conveying land to a feoffee to uses, the
medieval equivalent to a trustee, and having the feoffee retain legal title for the benefit of the
intended beneficiary (known as the cestui que use). Id. Hence, the use was a tax avoidance
device. At the same time, the common law did not give creditors a remedy against the interest
of a cestui que use. As a result, the use was also a creditor avoidance device. Id.
9 See 1 Rich. 2 c. 9 (1377) (Eng.) (invalidating enfeoffments made by landowners “to Lords
and other great Men of the Realm” in order to dissuade adverse claimants from pursuing claims
against the land); 50 Edw. 3 c. 6 (1376) (Eng.) (giving creditors the right to execute on land and
chattels of debtors who “give their Tenements and Chattels to their Friends, by Collusion
thereof to have the Profits at their Will”). See generally BEAN, supra note 1, at 125–26
(discussing regulation of uses by the English Parliament in the fourteenth century).
10 27 Hen. 8 c. 10 (1535) (Eng.).
11 The statute wiped out the legal title of the feoffee to uses. The statute conferred legal title
on the cestui que use, thus restoring the Crown’s ability to collect feudal incidents. See BEAN,
supra note 1, at 287–88; see also W.S. Holdsworth, The Political Causes Which Shaped the
Statute of Uses, 26 HARV. L. REV. 108 (1912) (describing the politics surrounding the Statute of
Uses).
12 See HESS, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 1, § 5.
13 Id.
14 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
637–39 (1995).
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original owner’s intended beneficiaries. 15 Moreover, the legal life estate
was near useless to a property owner whose assets consisted of
intangibles rather than land. 16 Third, the trust proved to be an efficient
mechanism for organizing business enterprises—both before and after
the advent of the modern corporation. 17 In other words, in many
circumstances, the use of the trust created efficiency gains; the settlor,
the trustee, and often the beneficiaries were better off with the trust in
place than if the settlor had tried to accomplish the same ends without
using the trust.
Traditional trust law doctrine constrained the freedom of trust
settlors in order to address some of the externalities and other
inefficiencies trusts might generate. For instance, until 1997, no
American state authorized self-settled asset protection trusts. 18 That is, a
settlor could not create a trust, name herself as a trust beneficiary, and
insulate the settlor’s beneficial interest from the settlor’s creditors. 19 The
well-established rule precluded a settlor and a trustee from making an
agreement that shifted risk from the settlor to the settlor’s future
contract and tort creditors—non-parties to the trust agreement.
The Rule Against Perpetuities acted as a check on the limited
foresight of the settlor. Although the trust settlor might be in an ideal
position to account for the proclivities and needs of her spouse and
children, the settlor is much less likely to anticipate the needs and
preferences of more remote descendants not yet born at the time the
settlor creates the trust. 20 The Rule operated as a limit on the settlor’s
“dead hand control” of the financial interests of remote descendants. 21
At the same time, the Rule limited the ability of wealthy settlors to create

See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 240–41 (8th ed. 2014).
See id. at 239–40 (noting statutory approaches for dealing with difficulty of life estate in
personal property); see also 1 ANDREW JAMES CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.27
(Andrew James Casner ed., 1952) (noting difficulties in creating legal life estates in personal
property, concluding that the trust is ideally suited for present and future interests of real
property, and indicating that even when the owner does not create a trust, “trust principles
should be applied so far as possible”).
17 See generally John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997).
18 In 1997, Alaska and Delaware enacted the first American statutes enabling settlors to
create self-settled asset protection trusts. See Sterk, supra note 4, at 1051–55.
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (retaining the
traditional rule that “[a] restraint on the voluntary and involuntary alienation of a beneficial
interest retained by the settlor of a trust is invalid”).
20 See generally STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 900–01 (5th
ed. 2015).
21 See Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND.
L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2014).
15
16
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perpetual trusts that would avoid the once-a-generation incidence of the
estate tax. 22
Starting with the 1990s, a number of state legislatures, prompted
largely by trust lawyers representing their clients—wealthy settlors and
trustees—increased the freedom of trust settlors to include provisions
that traditional doctrine prohibited. In many cases, these legislatures
acted to attract trust business from other states, and it might not have
been lost on legislators that the externalities they created would largely
be felt by out-of-staters. 23
Of course, not all trust “reform” legislation has imposed external
costs on third parties. Some critical legislation has been designed to
incorporate modern investment principles unfamiliar to common law
courts. In an effort to guard against loss of trust principal, common law
doctrine required trustees to avoid “risky” investments in general, and
in some states the prohibition extended to all investment in common
stock. 24 This approach, however, ignored the converse risk that inflation
would erode trust principal if principal were invested only in bonds and
mortgages. 25 Decades of inflation led more states to authorize trust
investments in “high grade” common stock. The central insight of
modern portfolio theory—that a prudent investor should not avoid risk
altogether, but should instead minimize risk through diversification—
ultimately became the centerpiece of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act,
which imposes on trustees an obligation to diversify trust investments. 26
At the same time, the Uniform Act (adopted almost universally) takes
the position that no investment is imprudent per se, so long as the

22 See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV.
1303, 1312–13 (2003) (noting that until the advent of the generation-skipping transfer tax
(GSTT), trusts could continue without estate taxation for the duration of the perpetuities
period, but not longer; after enactment of the GSTT, the Rule Against Perpetuities limited the
duration of trusts taking advantage of the GSTT exemption).
23 See Sterk, supra note 4, at 1066–70 (noting that externalities created by asset protection
trusts will be felt largely by out-of-state creditors).
24 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST.1935) (“In some States
it has been held that an investment in shares of stock is not a proper investment, unless
authorized by the terms of the trust.”). A number of jurisdictions adopted “legal lists” of
permitted trust investments, which typically focused on government bonds and first mortgages.
See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81
IOWA L. REV. 641, 643 (1996). The First Restatement itself did not go so far, instead embracing
what was then known as the “prudent man” rule, authorizing “only such investments as a
prudent man would make of his own property having primarily in view the preservation of the
estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be derived.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TRUSTS § 227(a).
25 See Langbein, supra note 24, at 645.
26 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). See generally Langbein,
supra note 24, at 646–49.
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trustee takes steps to diversify that investment, and to ensure that the
trust portfolio appropriately accounts for market risk. 27
II. DECANTING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: COMMON LAW ORIGINS,
STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT, AND PREVALENT USES
Trusts created after the advent of trust law “reforms” and other
change in law were, of course, in a position to take advantage of the
doctrinal changes. What of pre-existing trusts, many of which were
designed to last for decades, if not longer? Should the beneficiaries of
those trusts be entitled to benefit from potentially favorable changes in
law? Creative trust lawyers, acting on behalf of present and potential
clients, sought means to permit existing trusts to escape from nowunfavorable provisions that had been crafted to conform to the
limitations of prior law. Decanting, a recent innovation, 28 provided a
potential escape route.
A.

Mechanics and Common Law Origins

Consider first how decanting operates. 29 Suppose a mother created
a trust in her 1990 will and provided that the trustee, quarterly, should
distribute to her daughter as much of the income and principal of the
trust as the trustee, in its sole discretion, deemed appropriate. The will
further provided that at the daughter’s death, the remaining trust
principal should be distributed to the daughter’s issue, per stirpes.
Decanting would permit the trustee, during the daughter’s lifetime,
to transfer the trust assets into a new trust, with different terms. For
instance, the new trust could authorize the daughter to give her children
unequal shares of the trust principal upon her death, or could even
authorize the daughter to provide that the trust assets would pass to
people other than her children. 30 The new trust could extend the

27 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(e); see also id. § 2 cmt. (“Subsection 2(e) clarifies that
no particular kind of property or type of investment is inherently imprudent.”).
28 Jonathan Blattmachr, a New York practitioner, has been credited with drafting the
original New York decanting statute based on forms he used in practice. See David Restrepo,
Comment, New York’s Decanting Statute: Helping an Old Vintage Come to Life or Spoiling the
Settlor’s Fine Wine?, 34 PACE L. REV. 479, 487 (2014).
29 For simplicity, citations in this Section will be limited to the New York statute and the
Uniform Decanting Act. Other decanting statutes would generate similar results.
30 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(b)(1)–(2) (McKinney 2002) (authorizing a
trustee to grant a power of appointment to a current beneficiary, and to exclude as permissible
appointees only the beneficiary, the creator, the creator’s spouse, and any of their creditors or
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duration of the original trust, postponing ultimate distribution until the
daughter’s children reached the age of majority, or even until the death
of the last of the daughter’s children. 31
Decanting would also permit the trustee to divide the trust into
separate trusts for each of the daughter’s children. 32 It would permit the
trustee to locate the new “decanted” trust in a different state that might
have more advantageous tax rates. 33 The new trust could also ignore any
investment restrictions the mother placed on the trustee in the terms of
the original trust. 34
What basis is there for permitting a trustee to make such dramatic
changes in the nature of what the trust settlor intended to be an
irrevocable trust? Proponents of decanting drew an analogy between the
trustee and a familiar figure in trust law: the holder of a nongeneral
power of appointment. 35 Suppose a trust settlor wants to provide for a
spouse for life, and wants whatever remaining property divided among
the couple’s children at the spouse’s death. The spouse might survive the
settlor by many years, and in that intervening period, may accumulate
more information about the needs of the respective children. If the
settlor wants to take advantage of the surviving spouse’s information
estates); UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 11(e)–(f) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015) (authorizing
creation in a current beneficiary of a power of appointment that may be general or nongeneral).
31 See EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(e) (providing that the appointed trust may have a
term longer than that set forth in the original trust); see also id. § 10-6.6(p) (limiting
permissible duration to the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities); UNIF. TRUST DECANTING
ACT § 19 (providing that duration of the second trust may be longer than the first trust, but is
subject to any perpetuities rules applicable under state law to the property of the first trust).
32 The New York statute achieves this result by providing that the trustee “may appoint part
or all” of the trust principal to an appointed trust. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(b). If the
trustee can appoint part of the original trust to an appointed trust, the trustee can then appoint
another part to another appointed trust. Id. The Uniform Act’s comments make it clear that the
second trust may “divide a trust into more than one trust.” UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 11
cmt.
33 The New York statute explicitly provides that “[a]n authorized trustee shall consider the
tax implications of the exercise of the power under paragraph (b) or (c) of this section.” EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(o). The Uniform Act’s comment provides that the new trust may
“change the jurisdiction of the trust and the law governing the administration of the trust.”
UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 11 cmt.
34 Although the New York statute does not make this explicit, it nowhere limits the trustee’s
power to change investment provisions. The Uniform Act’s comment provides that the new
trust may “change the powers of the trustee” and “change administrative provisions of the
trust.” UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 11 cmt.
35 See, e.g., Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., An Analysis of the Tax Effects of Decanting, 47
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 141, 143–46 (2012). A general power of appointment is one that the
donee of the power may exercise in favor of herself, her estate, or the creditors of either; a
nongeneral power of appointment is one that is not general. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 17.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The “nongeneral”
terminology originated in the Internal Revenue Code; earlier terminology distinguished
between “general” and “special” powers. Id. cmt. b. Outside the tax context, the term “special
power” continues to be used with some frequency.

STERK.38.6.2 (Do Not Delete)

2002

7/6/2017 7:17 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1993

advantage, while still assuring that the children receive the property, the
settlor could give the spouse a nongeneral power to appoint the trust
property, by will, among the couple’s children. The nongeneral power
creates flexibility that would not exist if the settlor were forced to
specify, at the time of settlor’s own death, how the property should
ultimately be divided among the children.
It has long been established that the holder of a nongeneral power
of appointment can exercise that power by creating a new trust. 36 For
instance, if a settlor gives a spouse a special power to appoint property
among the couple’s issue, the spouse could exercise that power by
creating a trust for the benefit of the couple’s son for the son’s lifetime,
with a remainder to the son’s children at the son’s death.
Decanting statutes rest on the premise that a trustee with absolute
discretion to invade principal is the functional equivalent of the holder
of a nongeneral power. The argument runs as follows: The trustee, like
the holder of a nongeneral power, can exclude beneficiaries altogether
by exercising its invasion power to distribute all principal to a single
beneficiary. This “greater” power to exclude a beneficiary altogether
should carry with it the “lesser” power to reshape the beneficiary’s
interest in a new, decanted, trust.
The first problem with this argument (and with the underlying
analogy) is that in many cases, when a trust instrument gives the trustee
power to invade principal for the benefit of a single beneficiary, the
trustee has the power to exclude other beneficiaries in only one way: by
distributing the principal to that single beneficiary. A trust settlor does
not ordinarily expect a corporate trustee to alter the settlor’s dispositive
scheme—even though the settlor has authorized the trustee to do that
indirectly by transferring all of the trust principal to the life beneficiary.
The instrument may not give the trustee roving power to pick and
choose which other beneficiaries obtain the principal, and when. In this
respect, the trustee with power to invade is quite unlike the holder of a
nongeneral power; the settlor has given the holder explicit authority to
choose among potential beneficiaries. By comparison, when the settlor
grants a power of appointment to a family member, the settlor
deliberately gives the family member the power to alter the settlor’s
distribution scheme.
Second, the analogy between the trustee with power to invade and
the holder of a nongeneral power of appointment is particularly
problematic when the trustee is a compensated professional rather than
a close family member. When the settlor gives a spouse or other family
36 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 19.14
(“[T]he donee of a nongeneral power is authorized to make an appointment in any form,
including one in trust . . . .”).
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member a nongeneral power of appointment, the holder of the power
typically receives no compensation for exercising it, and does not stand
to benefit personally from exercising the power by creating a new trust.
By contrast, trustees, who are typically compensated, do stand to gain
financially by extending the duration of the trust—and, consequently,
the duration of the stream of commissions.
Third, the trust settlor may not regard the role of the trustee, who
is often chosen primarily for investment and management expertise, as
equivalent to the role of a power of appointment holder selected
primarily for knowledge of the needs and wants of family members. 37
When the trust settlor gives a family member a nongeneral power to
appoint principal among various beneficiaries, the settlor expressly
confers on that family member the power to select the ultimate
beneficiaries of the trust and imposes no fiduciary obligations on the
family member. By contrast, when the settlor selects a trustee,
particularly a corporate trustee, the settlor imposes fiduciary duties on
the trustee. This difference has led the Reporter for the Uniform Trust
Decanting Act to prepare a memo contending that decanting authority
should not be treated as a power of appointment. 38
In light of these difficulties with the argument for decanting, it
should not be surprising that in Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co., 39 the
case generally cited as the origin of the common law power to decant
trusts, 40 the trustee happened to be the settlor’s spouse, and the settlor
had directly conferred on that trustee the power to make final
disposition of the trust principal. In Phipps, the settlor appointed her
husband and a trust company as co-trustees, and gave her husband, as
an individual, the power, in his sole discretion, to decide how the trust
income or principal should be divided among the couple’s four
children. 41 When the corporate trustee had doubts about whether the
husband could exercise this power by creating a new trust, largely for
the benefit of the same four children, the Florida Supreme Court upheld
the husband’s power to create the new trust. 42
37 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 22, at 1338 (noting that corporate trustees are
sometimes selected to avoid the problem that trusted friends eventually die, but trustees do not,
and noting that over time, the representatives of the corporate trustee may end up to be people
quite different from the sort the trustee would have chosen).
38 See Memorandum from the Unif. Decanting Distributions Drafting Comm. on
Decanting Issues 1 (Dec. 2013), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trustdecanting/
2013dec_TDA_Issues%20Memo.pdf.
39 196 So. 299 (Fla. 1940).
40 See Blattmachr et al., supra note 35, at 146; Thomas E. Simmons, Decanting and Its
Alternatives: Remodeling and Revamping Irrevocable Trusts, 55 S.D. L. REV. 253, 256–57 (2010);
Restrepo, supra note 28, at 481–83.
41 Phipps, 196 So. at 300.
42 Id. at 301.
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Until the decanting movement hit state legislatures, only a single
common law case had upheld the power of corporate trustees to use its
discretion to distribute principal as a basis for creating an entirely new
trust with different remainder beneficiaries. Seward Johnson, an heir to
the Johnson & Johnson pharmaceutical fortune, created a trust in 1944
for the benefit of his son, giving trustees “absolute and uncontrolled
discretion” to distribute trust principal to the son whenever the trustees
determined that distribution would be in the son’s best interests. 43 The
trust instrument also gave the son a power to appoint any remaining
trust property by will, and provided that if the son did not exercise the
power, the trust property would be divided among the son’s issue, per
stirpes. 44 The trustees had not distributed any principal to the son, but
they were willing to make distribution to a trust created by the son on
terms that would eliminate the remainder interests of two of the son’s
children. In Wiedenmayer v. Johnson, the trustees sought approval of the
arrangement, and a divided court gave its blessing, relying on the broad
discretion Seward Johnson had conferred on the trustees. 45
Recognizing that this single case represented a slender reed on
which to fashion a power to decant trusts, proponents of decanting
turned to state legislatures for assistance.
B.
1.

Statutory Decanting
New York Origins

Proponents of decanting won their first legislative victory in 1992,
when the New York legislature enacted the country’s first decanting
statute. 46 Tax avoidance was the impetus for the New York statute.
When Congress enacted a new generation-skipping transfer tax (GSTT)
in 1986, it exempted from the tax’s operation all trusts that had become
irrevocable by September 25, 1985. 47 Enactment of the new tax made it
advantageous to extend the duration of exempt “grandfathered” trusts.
The New York legislature responded by authorizing a trustee with
absolute discretion to invade principal for the benefit of one or more

43 Wiedenmayer v. Johnson, 254 A.2d 534, 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff’d sub nom.
Wiedenmayer v. Villanueva, 259 A.2d 465 (N.J. 1969) (per curiam).
44 Id. at 536 (Conford, J., dissenting in part).
45 Id. at 535–36 (majority opinion).
46 See Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 591, 1992 N.Y. Laws 3520 (codified as amended at N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2002)).
47 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 1433(b)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 2085, 2731.
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income beneficiaries to create a new trust with a longer duration, so
long as the new trust did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. 48
Proponents of the New York statute, and ultimately the state
legislature, justified the new statute as a “clarification” of the principle
that “a trustee with an absolute power to invade principal is analogous
to a donee of a special power of appointment.” 49 As we have seen, by
1986, it had been established, both in New York and elsewhere, that the
holder of a nongeneral power of appointment was entitled to exercise
the power by creating a further trust instead of merely distributing the
property outright to some or all of the designated beneficiaries. 50 The
legislature relied on Phipps and one other out-of-state case for the
proposition that a trustee with an unlimited power of invasion may
appoint property in further trust. 51 The legislative history made no
mention of Wiedenmayer, and ignored differences between the typical
holder of a nongeneral power of appointment and the typical corporate
trustee with power to invade principal.
The New York statute did impose significant limits on the power to
decant. First, a trustee could decant to another trust only if the trust
instrument conferred upon the trustee absolute discretion to invade the
principal of the trust; a trustee could not decant if her power was limited
to invasion for the health, education, maintenance, and support of the
beneficiaries. 52 Second, the trustee could decant only with the consent of
the beneficiaries or pursuant to a court order. 53 Third, the trust into
which the trustee decanted had to comply with the Rule Against
Perpetuities, as measured from the creation of the original trust. 54

48 EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(b). The statute also required consent of all persons
interested in the trust. For the statute’s legislative history, see N.Y. State Legislative Annual,
1992, ch. 591, at 364–67.
49 N.Y. State Legislative Annual, 1992, ch. 591, at 365.
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 19.3 cmt. a, illus. 2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1986).
51 N.Y. State Legislative Annual, 1992, ch. 591, at 366. Only one of the two cases, Phipps v.
Palm Beach Trust Co., 196 So. 299 (Fla. 1940), provided direct support for the legislature’s
proposition. In the other case, Estate of Spencer, 232 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1975), the settlor had
explicitly given her husband a special power of appointment, and the court indicated that the
holder of a special power is entitled to exercise the power by creating a further trust; the court
did not focus on the power of a trustee with invasion power to create an entirely new trust.
Moreover, the court ultimately invalidated the husband’s exercise of the power as inconsistent
with the wife’s instructions.
52 See Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 591, § 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 3520, 3521 (codified as amended at
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(b)(1)).
53 Id. (codified as amended at EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(b)(1)–(2)).
54 EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-8.1 provides that for an estate created by an instrument
exercising a power of appointment other than a presently exercisable general power, the Rule
Against Perpetuities period runs from the time of the creation of the power. Because the New
York decanting statute conceptualized exercise of the decanting power as exercise of a
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These statutory provisions limited the value of decanting for many
trustees. For tax and other reasons, many settlors constrain the trustee’s
discretion to invade principal, limiting the discretion to funds necessary
for the “health, education, support, or maintenance” of the income
beneficiary. 55 By the terms of the New York statute, the trustee of such a
trust could not decant, because the trustee’s discretion, while quite
broad, was not “absolute.” The statute’s consent requirement proved
problematic for trustees seeking to preserve the trust’s GSTT exemption,
because a treasury regulation exempted such trusts only if the trustee
could make distributions without the consent of the beneficiaries. 56 The
judicial approval requirement increased the cost of decanting. The
perpetuities limitation made decanting less useful to trustees who
sought to decant into “dynasty” trusts that would last for multiple
generations—trusts prohibited by New York’s restrictive Rule Against
Perpetuities, but increasingly permitted elsewhere. 57
2.

Expansion to Other States

Other states gradually joined the decanting bandwagon, often with
provisions substantially more liberal than those in the New York
statute. 58 Nevada and South Dakota provide extreme examples. Both
statutes confer broad decanting powers on trustees even when the trust
instrument confers tightly constrained discretion on the trustee. 59 An
nongeneral power of appointment, the perpetuities period for the new trust would be
determined in accordance with section 10-8.1.
55 26 U.S.C. § 2041(a)–(b) (2012) includes with a decedent’s taxable estate all property over
which decedent has a general power of appointment. Section 2041(b) then defines general
powers of appointment to exclude powers “limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the
health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent.” Especially when the trustee is also
an object of the power of appointment, the settlor often seeks to avoid a general power that
would subject the appointive property to taxation in the trustee-beneficiary’s estate.
56 See EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6 (Practice Commentaries, Margaret Valentine
Turano) (discussing the 2001 amendment enacted by Act of Aug. 20, 2001, ch. 204, 2001 N.Y.
Laws 1482).
57 New York itself amended its statute to eliminate the beneficiary consent or judicial
approval requirement. Act of Aug. 20, 2001, ch. 204, 2001 N.Y. Laws 1482 (subsequently
amended 2011) (relating to the powers of an appointed trustee to invade principal of a trust).
Later, the legislatures authorized decanting, subject to some limitations, even when the trustee
does not have unlimited discretion. Act of Aug. 17, 2011, ch. 451, 2011 N.Y. Laws 1300 (adding
the current section to EPTL section 10-6.6.).
58 For instance, the South Dakota statute authorizes decanting even when the trustee’s
discretion under the first trust was restricted by a standard, does not require notice to the trust
beneficiaries, and does not protect mandatory income interests created in the first trust. See
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15 (2012).
59 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556(1) (West 2013) (giving a trustee with discretion to
distribute trust income or principal to a beneficiary the power to appoint the trust property
subject to that discretion in favor of a second trust, without regard to the scope of the discretion
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example illustrates the breadth of these statutes. Suppose the trust
instrument gives the trustee limited discretion to distribute income and
principal as needed for the health, education, maintenance, or support
of the settlor’s daughter, and directs the trustee, at the daughter’s death,
to distribute the trust principal to the daughter’s issue, per stirpes.
Under the terms of the trust instrument, the trustee would not be
entitled to distribute the trust principal to the daughter unless the
daughter needed that principal for the specified purposes. Yet under the
Nevada and South Dakota statutes, the trustee would be entitled to
decant the entire trust principal into a new trust that expanded the
trustee’s discretion to make principal payments to the daughter, or into
a new trust that cut out one or more of the daughter’s issue, or both. 60
Moreover, neither the Nevada statute nor the South Dakota statute
requires the trustee to provide notice to beneficiaries that the trustee has
decided to decant the trust property. 61 Although elimination of a notice
requirement is championed as a mechanism for maintaining privacy,
without notice it becomes difficult for a beneficiary adversely affected by
decanting to challenge the trustee’s action.
Nevada and South Dakota remain at the vanguard of the decanting
movement, but jurisdictional competition has already emerged. Lawyers
have started ranking states for their friendliness to trust decanting. 62
About half of the states have now enacted decanting statutes. 63 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has authorized decanting even
without benefit of a statute. 64

given to the trustee in the trust instrument); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15 (including a similar
provision).
60 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15. Under the South
Dakota statute, the trustee must make a determination that the appointment to the second trust
is “necessary or desirable after taking into account the purposes of the first trust, the terms and
conditions of the second trust, and the consequences of the distribution.” The flexibility of that
language would appear to impose few constraints on the trustee.
61 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556(7) provides that “[b]efore appointing property . . . , a
trustee may give notice of a proposed action.” (emphasis added). S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-218 provides that “[t]he trustee of the first trust may notify all beneficiaries of the first trust, in
writing, at least twenty days prior to the effective date of the trustee’s exercise of the power.”
(emphasis added).
62 See, e.g., Steven Oshins, 4th Annual Trust Decanting State Rankings Chart, LAW OFFICES
OF OSHINS & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. (Jan. 2017), https://media.wix.com/ugd/b211fb_5b23644c0bab
488d9d06864ce66c845b.pdf.
63 Id.
64 Morse v. Kraft, 992 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass. 2013).

STERK.38.6.2 (Do Not Delete)

2008

7/6/2017 7:17 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
3.

[Vol. 38:1993

The Uniform Trust Decanting Act

Against a landscape of divergent decanting statutes, the Uniform
Law Commissioners have recently promulgated the Uniform Decanting
Act. Like most decanting statutes, 65 the Uniform Act authorizes
decanting only when the trust confers discretion on the trustee. 66 If the
trust simply requires the trustee to distribute all income to one or more
life beneficiaries until their death, and then to distribute trust principal
to designated remaindermen, the trustee may not decant; trustees and
beneficiaries frustrated with the trust’s terms are relegated to the two
common law alternatives: live with the terms or seek judicial
modification.
When the trust instrument does confer discretion on a trustee, the
scope of the trustee’s decanting power varies with the scope of that
discretion. Many trust instruments confer on the trustee discretion
constrained by an “ascertainable standard”—a term derived from tax
law. For instance, a trust instrument might mandate that the trustee
make payment for the “health, education, maintenance, and support” of
the trust beneficiary, but give the trustee limited discretion to decide
what is necessary for health, education, maintenance, and support.
Recall that in this situation, the Nevada and South Dakota statutes
authorize the trustee to decant into a new trust that substantially
expands the trustee’s discretion. The Uniform Act is more moderate. It
treats the trustee as having “limited” discretion, and permits the trustee
to decant only into a trust that preserves for the original trust
beneficiaries’ interests that are “substantially similar” to those they
enjoyed under the original trust instrument. 67 This limited discretion is
unlikely to interfere substantially with the settlor’s intent.
By contrast, under the Uniform Act, the trustee’s decanting power
is at its broadest when the trust instrument confers on the trustee what
the statute calls “expanded . . . discretion.” A comment to the statute
provides the rationale for the broad decanting power:

65 Even the South Dakota statute, sometimes hailed as the most decanting-friendly statute,
requires that the trustee have discretion to make a distribution of income or principal. S.D.
CODIFIED LAW § 55-2-15. For a ranking concluding that South Dakota is the most decantingfriendly state, see Oshins, supra note 62.
66 Section 11 of the Uniform Act authorizes decanting when the trustee has
“expanded . . . discretion,” while section 12 authorizes decanting when the trustee has
“limited . . . discretion.” Section 2(11) defines “[e]xpanded . . . discretion” as “a discretionary
power of distribution that is not limited to an ascertainable standard or a reasonably definite
standard.” UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
67 Id. § 12(c).
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When a trustee is granted expanded . . . discretion, that is an
indication that the settlor intended to rely on the trustee’s judgment
and discretion in making distributions. The settlor’s faith in the
trustee’s judgment supports the assumption that the settlor would
trust the trustee’s judgment in making modifications to the trust
instrument in light of changed circumstances including the
beneficiary’s circumstances and changes in tax and other laws. 68

What is the expanded discretion that signals such confidence in the
trustee’s judgment? The statutory definitions provide that
“‘[e]xpanded . . . discretion’ means a discretionary power of distribution
that is not limited to an ascertainable standard or a reasonably definite
standard.”69 So, for instance, a trust instrument that authorizes the
trustee to distribute to a beneficiary, during her lifetime, “as much of the
income and principal of the trust as the trustee, in her discretion, deems
appropriate” is a trust that confers expanded discretion on the trustee.
The drafters of the statute apparently assume that a settlor who
authorizes a trustee to determine how much trust principal a current
beneficiary (often a spouse or a child) should receive during the
beneficiary’s lifetime also trusts the trustee to make significant changes
in the beneficiaries of the trust, the trust’s terms, and the trust’s
duration.
The drafters were unwilling, however, to give the trustee carte
blanche. In particular, the decanting statute limits the trustee’s power to
interfere with mandatory distributions of income or principal to a
current beneficiary unless the trust instrument conferred on the trustee
discretion to distribute trust principal to another beneficiary, 70 and
prohibits the trustee from adding beneficiaries not named in the
original trust instrument. 71
Subject to that limitation, the statute confers on the trustee
substantial authority to rewrite the terms of the trust. Suppose, for
instance, a trust instrument provides that upon the current beneficiary’s
death, the remaining property should be distributed to the beneficiary’s
children in equal shares. The trustee could decant into a new trust that
eliminated that remainder interest and instead gave the life beneficiary a
power of appointment that would enable her to prefer some children
over others, or even to cut out her children altogether. The rationale for
giving the trustee this power is plausible enough: even under the
original trust instrument, the trustee could have distributed all of the

68
69
70
71

Id. § 11 cmt.
Id. § 2(11).
Id. § 11(d).
Id. § 11(c)(1)–(2).
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trust principal to the current beneficiary outright, leaving her to
redistribute that property as she sees fit.
The statutory decanting power also encompasses changes that the
trustee could not easily have accomplished under the terms of the
original instrument. Suppose a trust gives the trustee discretion to make
payments of income and principal to a settlor’s husband during the
husband’s lifetime, and gives the husband a general testamentary power
of appointment (which would effectively permit the husband to direct
how the principal should be distributed at his death). The decanting
statute would authorize the trustee to decant the trust principal into a
new trust that withdraws from the husband the power to choose
successor beneficiaries, leaving the trust property to pass to “takers in
default”: the people the settlor designated as alternative beneficiaries in
the event the husband never exercised his power. 72 The trustee could go
even further, and give the settlor’s son (who might not also be the
husband’s son) a power to direct how the trust principal should be
distributed at the husband’s death. 73 In these cases, the decanting statute
gives the trustee broad discretion to change trust beneficiaries in ways
not contemplated by the trust instrument—even though the statute
precludes the trustee from adding new beneficiaries not included in the
original trust instrument. 74 The Uniform Act (unlike the Nevada and
South Dakota statutes) does require the trustee to provide notice to all
qualified beneficiaries before decanting into a new trust, 75 but whether
the notice requirement imposes an effective constraint on the trustee
remains to be seen.
Although the statute generally safeguards the interests of current
beneficiaries of the trust, it does permit the trustee to make substantial
changes in the nature of those interests. First, if the trust instrument
requires the trustee to make payments of income or principal to the
beneficiary when the beneficiary reaches a certain age, the trustee can
decant into a trust that eliminates those mandatory payments. 76 Second,
even though the original trust instrument would have enabled the
beneficiary to assign his interest and would make that interest available
to the beneficiary’s creditors, the trustee can convert the trust into a
Id. § 11(d)(2).
Id. § 11(d)(4) (allowing a trustee to create power of appointment in a presumptive
remainder beneficiary); see also id. § 11 cmt. (indicating that a taker in default qualifies as a
presumptive remainder beneficiary).
74 Id. § 11(c).
75 Id. § 7.
76 The statute explicitly prohibits elimination of a right to a mandatory distribution if the
distribution is a current right of the current beneficiary. Id. § 11 (d)(1)–(3). The comment
makes clear, however, that the right is not a current right if the beneficiary has not yet reached
the age at which the distribution becomes mandatory. Id. § 11 cmt.
72
73
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“spendthrift” trust that precludes assignment and puts the assets beyond
the reach of the beneficiary’s creditors. 77 Conversely, if the settlor
explicitly included a spendthrift provision in the original trust
instrument, the trustee, through decanting, can eliminate the
spendthrift protection the settlor provided for the beneficiary. 78
The statute’s comment includes a non-exhaustive list of other
changes the trustee can make. Among the most significant are the power
to extend the duration of the trust beyond the termination date specified
by the settlor, and the power to change the jurisdiction of the trust and
the law governing the trust’s administration. 79
4.

The Role of Fiduciary Duty

The Uniform Act’s primary bulwark against inappropriate use of
the decanting power is section 4’s command that “[i]n exercising the
decanting power, an authorized fiduciary shall act in accordance with its
fiduciary duties, including the duty to act in accordance with the
purposes of the first trust.” 80 That is, a trust beneficiary who believes the
trustee has modified the trust in a manner inconsistent with the settlor’s
purposes may bring an action against the trustee for breach of fiduciary
duty. In this respect, the Uniform Act resembles a number of other state
statutes. 81 By contrast, statutes in the most decanting-friendly states do
not even include language imposing an express fiduciary constraint on
exercise of the decanting power. 82
Even in jurisdictions that impose a fiduciary duty constraint on the
trustee, substantive and process issues cast doubt on the constraint’s
potential effectiveness in deterring or remedying trustee abuse of the
decanting power. As a matter of substance, the vagueness of the
fiduciary duty standard is likely to result in excessive judicial deference
to questionable trustee decisions. Section 4 itself provides little guidance
about when a decision to decant would breach the trustee’s fiduciary
duty. 83 Because the Uniform Act (and any other decanting statute)
Id. § 11 cmt.
Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. § 4(a).
81 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(h) (McKinney 2002).
82 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556 (West 2013) (containing no fiduciary language); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15 (2012) (requiring a trustee to determine whether exercise “is
necessary or desirable after taking into account the purposes of the first trust, the terms and
conditions of the second trust, and the consequences of the distribution,” but imposing no
express obligation that the trustee act as a fiduciary).
83 Section 4(a) requires that the trustee “act in accordance with the purposes of the first
trust,” but the comment notes that
77
78
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confers on trustees the power to decant, and imposes express limits on
the exercise of that power, courts are prone to conclude—incorrectly—
that so long as the trustee does not exceed statutory power, the trustee
has not breached its fiduciary duty. The tendency to conclude that
exercise of an express power relieves a trustee of breach of duty claims is
all too familiar in other areas of trust law. 84
As a matter of process, litigation cost acts as a deterrent for
beneficiaries shortchanged by exercise of the decanting power.
Especially if the shortchanged beneficiary is entitled only to a modest
share of trust proceeds, the cost of litigation may exceed any potential
benefit, and there is no assurance that the beneficiary will be entitled to
recover those costs even if the litigation proves successful. 85
Finally, when the issue is whether decanting violates public policy,
fiduciary duty acts as no constraint at all; the trust beneficiaries may be
complicit with the trustee in seeking decanting. In that instance, third
parties harmed by decanting would not have standing to sue for breach
of fiduciary duty.
C.

Uses of Decanting

The growth in decanting calls for explanation: why are lawyers and
legislators so enamored of the concept? Empirical data on how trustees
and their lawyers are using the decanting power is not readily available.
First, decanting is a relatively novel phenomenon. Second, a primary
objective of modern decanting is to bypass the need for judicial approval
of trust modification, so that judicial opinions would not provide a
ready source of information about how lawyers use the decanting
[t]he exercise of the decanting power need not be in accord with the literal terms of
the first-trust instrument because decanting by definition is a modification of the
terms of the first trust. Therefore subsection 4(c) provides that the terms of the first
trust shall be deemed to include the decanting power for purposes of determining the
fiduciary duties of the authorized fiduciary.
UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 4 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). In other words, in
determining whether decanting breached a fiduciary duty, a court should assume (often
contrary to fact) that the settlor authorized the trustee to decant.
84 For instance, when a trust instrument confers on a trustee the power to retain assets held
by the settlor at the time the trust is created “if in their discretion they shall deem it
prudent . . . so to do,” courts tend to absolve the trustee of liability for breach of fiduciary duty
even if the trustee’s decision was objectively imprudent. See In re Wege Trust, No. 274217, 2008
WL 2439904, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2008) (per curiam).
85 Moreover, even when successful beneficiaries do recover attorneys’ fees, courts may
direct that the fees come from the trust assets—reducing the pie from which the beneficiary
may receive future benefits. See, e.g., Capaldi v. Richards, 870 A.2d 493, 498 (Del. 2005)
(concluding that the court below abused its discretion by rejecting a claim by the beneficiaries
to recover fees from trust assets).

STERK.38.6.2 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

7/6/2017 7:17 PM

TRUST DECANTING

2013

power. Nevertheless, much of the practitioner literature discussing
decanting catalogues the uses authorized by New York courts during the
period in which the New York statute required judicial approval of
decanting.
The catalogue, however, is unlikely to provide a representative
picture of decanting usage. First, relatively few cases reached the courts
during that period. Second, the need for judicial approval created a
selection bias: only those cases where decanting would have generated
significant financial benefits—those large enough to warrant the cost of
a legal proceeding—would make it to court and elicit judicial opinions.
Moreover, the decided cases would tend to reveal only those cases where
the trustee or its lawyers concluded that the reasons for decanting would
be appealing to a judge. Once legislatures began authorizing decanting
without judicial approval, one might reasonably expect a shift in usage
patterns.
Nevertheless, multiple discussions 86 of decanting start by
identifying the following uses 87 of decanting the New York courts have
supposedly 88 authorized:
1. protecting the tax treatment of a trust;
2. granting a beneficiary a power of appointment, presently
exercisable or otherwise;
3. reducing administrative costs;
4. altering trusteeship provisions such as the identity or
manner of appointing fiduciaries;
5. extending the termination date of a trust;
6. converting a nongrantor trust to a grantor trust or the
reverse;
7. changing a trust’s governing law;
8. dividing trust property to create separate trusts;
9. reducing potential liability;
86 These identical lists appear in a letter from Louis Mezzullo, American College of Trust
and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) to the Internal Revenue Service commenting on potential tax
treatment of decanting and in An Analysis of the Tax Effects of Decanting. Letter from Louis A.
Mezzullo, President, Am. Coll. of Tr. & Estate Counsel, to Internal Revenue Serv. 5–6 (Apr. 2,
2012) [hereinafter ACTEC Letter], http://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Mezzullo_Comments_04_
02_12.pdf (including an identical list in a letter commenting on potential tax treatment of
decanting); Blattmachr et al., supra note 35, at 148–49.
87 See Blattmachr et al., supra note 35, at 148–49; ACTEC Letter, supra note 86.
88 In fact, the authority cited for two of the items on the list—granting a beneficiary a power
of appointment and converting a nongrantor trust to a grantor trust or the reverse—does not
include any New York court decision, but instead focuses, respectively, on a Florida court
decision and a memorandum by the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service. See
Blattmachr et al., supra note 35, at 148 nn.30 & 34; ACTEC Letter, supra note 86, at 5 nn.14 &
18.
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10. converting a trust into a supplemental needs trust to permit
a beneficiary to qualify for certain governmental benefits;
and
11. making trust instruments spendthrift or the reverse.
Of the eleven potential uses, four (protecting tax treatment,
extending trust duration, converting trusts from grantor trusts to
nongrantor trusts or the reverse, and changing governing law) are
largely or exclusively tax-driven. Another three (reducing liability,
converting into a special needs trust, and making the trust spendthrift)
are designed to shift costs from the trust beneficiaries to third parties—
either creditors or taxpayers. Only four could plausibly be regarded as
benefiting trust beneficiaries without shifting costs to others—and even
some of those can be used to reduce taxes or avoid creditor claims. 89
The same literature identifies three other supposedly common uses
of decanting:
1. addressing changed circumstances, such as changes in
applicable fiduciary law or changes in family circumstances
or dynamics;
2. modifying administrative provisions, such as restrictions
on investment powers or on authority to create a “directed
trust”; or
3. correcting a drafting error without going to court. 90
These uses might or might not shift costs to third parties, depending on
what the changes in fiduciary law might be, and what “drafting errors”
decanting would correct; for instance, many of the drafting errors
parties seek to correct through judicial action (rather than trust

89 For instance, by decanting into a trust that gives a life beneficiary a general power of
appointment, the trustee could insure that the ultimate trust beneficiaries obtain the benefit of a
stepped-up income tax basis at the death of a life beneficiary, a benefit that is particularly
important when the life beneficiary’s estate is too small to incur federal estate tax liability. See
Peter J. Melcher, Robert S. Keebler & Steven J. Oshins, A Guide to Trust Decanting, TR. & EST.,
May 2015, at 15, 15–16, https://media.wix.com/ugd/b211fb_20f9fb5acf1545bd9dbc01fce29119b
2.pdf .
90 Blattmachr et al., supra note 35, at 149; ACTEC Letter, supra note 86, at 6. Another
catalogue of objectives that decanting can achieve includes: eliminating mandatory
distributions to beneficiaries, eliminating some beneficiaries altogether, and altering
beneficiaries’ rights to information about the trust. See Kimberly E. Cohen, Partner, Ropes &
Gray, ALI CLE Presentation: Decanting: Facts, Fallacies, and Fantasies (May 1, 2015). These
objectives may not impose external costs, but they do raise questions about whether the trust
settlor intended to confer on the trustee such significant deviations from the terms of the
original trust.
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decanting) are errors that would generate adverse tax consequences for
the beneficiaries. 91
Although one strand of the practitioner literature emphasizes
decanting’s wide range of benefits, another strand—more concerned
with marketing the use of decanting—focuses heavily on the tax and
asset protection benefits associated with decanting. 92 The emphasis on
tax savings should not be surprising. The thorough empirical study by
Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff establishes that much of the
transfer of trust assets to states abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities
has been driven by the desire of trust settlors to minimize taxation. 93 It
would be surprising if trustees and beneficiaries would not also respond
to the opportunity to minimize taxation through decanting.
III. DECANTING AS A DEVICE FOR EFFECTUATING SETTLOR INTENT
In light of the growing support for trust decanting, two questions
merit more attention than they have so far received. Part IV deals with
one of those questions: When, if at all, should public policy limit the
availability of trust decanting? This Part deals with an equally significant
question: When does decanting operate to promote the intent of the
trust settlor—the person who created the trust and signed the document
whose terms the trustees now seek to avoid?
Typically, the effect of a donative document—including a trust—is
determined by the intent of the donor. 94 Trusts, however, can endure for
a number of years, and no settlor can foresee all of the events that might
91 See, e.g., In re Paul F. Suhr Trust, 222 P.3d 506 (Kan. 2010) (authorizing trust
modification to permit an estate to pass tax free); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2010) (authorizing modification of trusts to achieve settlor’s tax objectives).
92 See, e.g., Matthew D. Blattmachr, Alaska Takes Already Top-Tier Trust Code up Another
Notch, TR. ADVISOR (July 14, 2013), http://thetrustadvisor.com/tag/top-trust-friendly-states
(emphasizing that the Alaska statute “specifically allows for the ability to extend the duration of
a trust, the ability to grant a lifetime power of appointment to a beneficiary and the ability to
decant for purposes of protecting public assistance benefits”); Steven J. Oshins & Brian J.
Simmons, Decanting an Irrevocable Trust: The “Do-Over” Trust, PREMIER TR., http://
info.premiertrust.com/rs/fmapremieretrust/images/Decanting%20an%20Irrevocable%
20Trust%20%20The%20Do-Over%20Trust.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (four of the first five
reasons for decanting emphasize either tax or asset protection concerns).
93 Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of
the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2497 (2006); Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra
note 5, at 359–61.
94 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Unless disallowed by law, the donor’s intention not only
determines the meaning but also the effect of a donative document.”); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The phrase ‘terms of the trust’ means the
manifestation of intention of the settlor with respect to the trust provisions expressed in a
manner that admits of its proof in judicial proceedings.”).
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occur over the life of the trust. 95 As a result, the language of the trust can
serve only as an imperfect indicator of what a settlor would have wanted
had the settlor possessed full information about post-death events. The
problem is not new, but a number of relatively recent trends have
exacerbated the difficulty. First, the modification or abolition of the
Rule Against Perpetuities in many states has made it possible for settlors
to create trusts of longer duration, 96 while the generation-skipping
transfer tax exemption has created financial incentives for settlors to
establish perpetual, or near perpetual, trusts. 97 Trust language is unlikely
to account for future events the settlor could not foresee, and the longer
the trust lasts, the more likely it is that unforeseen events actually occur.
Second, trust law itself has been more volatile over the last two decades
than it had been for much of its history: the advent of the prudent
investor rule, 98 the principal and income act, 99 and the growth of asset
protection trusts, 100 to take a few examples, are events that the typical
settlor—and the settlor’s lawyers—might not have foreseen.
A.

Alternatives to Decanting: Traditional Mechanisms for
Adapting to Changed Circumstances

Trust law has long recognized the need to account for changes that
arise after the trust’s creation. First, doctrine has long recognized the
right of trust beneficiaries to terminate a trust by consent, so long as
termination would not frustrate a material purpose of the settlor. 101

95 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2766–67 (2006). For a discussion of other problems generated by the
imperfect foresight that afflict settlors who create trusts of long duration, see Melanie B. Leslie,
Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 87–88
(2005).
96 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 22, at 1327–28 (noting that the problem of limited
foresight is exacerbated with the advent of perpetual trusts).
97 The exemption from the GSTT is now set at an amount equal to the basic exclusion
amount from the estate tax. 26 U.S.C. § 2631(c) (2012). In 2010, that amount was set at
$5,000,000, adjusted for inflation. Id. § 2010(c)(3). With the current estate tax rate set at forty
percent, wealthy people have significant incentives to create perpetual trusts that avoid estate
taxation at each generation. See id. § 2001(c).
98 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
99 The Uniform Principal and Income Act, now enacted in almost every state, authorizes
trustees to depart from traditional conceptions of income and principal in order to enable
trustees to make investment decisions that accord with the insights behind the prudent investor
rule. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT, Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2008).
100 See supra notes 18, 23 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (AM. LAW INST. 1959); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 337 (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
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American National Bank of Cheyenne v. Miller 102 illustrates the
doctrine. The Wyoming Supreme Court authorized the trust
beneficiaries to terminate a trust while the settlor’s son-in-law was still
alive even though, by the terms of the trust instrument, the trust was to
endure until the son-in-law’s death. The settlor had created the trust in
1967, authorizing the trustee to support the settlor during her own
lifetime, and then to make monthly payments to the daughter-in-law
and son for their lives, while also authorizing payments to the couple to
assist with the educational expenses of the settlor’s grandchildren. 103
Only at the death of the couple was the trustee to distribute the trust
property to the ultimate beneficiaries—the settlor’s grandchildren and a
scholarship fund at a university. 104 Twenty-five years after the trust was
created, after the death of the settlor and her daughter, the son-in-law
waived any further right to trust income and he, together with the
remainder beneficiaries, sought termination of the trust. 105 In ordering
termination (over the objection of the trustee), the court emphasized
that no material purpose of the settlor remained to be accomplished. 106
Although the “black letter” of the first two Trusts Restatements
explicitly authorized trust beneficiaries to consent to termination, they
were silent about the power of beneficiaries to modify a trust. 107 The
most recent Restatement of Trusts, however, explicitly authorizes both
modification and termination upon consent of the beneficiaries. 108
Even if the beneficiaries do not consent, 109 traditional doctrine also
permits the trustee to deviate from a term of the trust if, owing to
circumstances not known to or anticipated by the settlor, compliance
with the term “would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment
of the purposes of the trust.” 110 In re Pulitzer’s Estate 111 represents the
most famous application of the doctrine. Journalist Joseph Pulitzer had
established a trust whose assets included stock in a company that
899 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1995).
Id. at 1339.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1340.
107 A comment, however, authorized partial termination when complete termination would
interfere with a settlor’s material purpose. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 cmt. p
(AM. LAW INST. 1959) (permitting partial termination of a trust).
108 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). The Third Restatement
also contracts the material purpose exception in the earlier Restatements by providing that the
inclusion of a spendthrift clause, or of language conferring discretion on a trustee, is not by
itself sufficient to establish that termination or modification would conflict with a material
purpose of the settlor. Id. cmt. e.
109 Sometimes, obtaining the consent of all beneficiaries may be impossible because some
beneficiaries may be unborn.
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 (providing for a change of circumstances).
111 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), aff’d, 237 A.D. 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932).
102
103
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published The World newspaper. The trust’s terms prohibited the sale or
disposition of company stock and enjoined upon the trustees “the duty
of preserving, perfecting and perpetuating ‘The World’ newspaper.” 112
When the newspaper incurred financial losses year after year—both
before and after the 1929 stock market crash—the trustees sought to sell
the newspaper company stock, and the court authorized the sale,
emphasizing that Pulitzer “could not have intended that from mere
vanity, the publication of the newspapers . . . should be persisted in until
the entire trust asset was destroyed or wrecked by bankruptcy or
dissolution.”113
Again, the most recent Restatements of Trusts and Property
expand the availability of judicial modification. While earlier
Restatements authorized modification of administrative provisions, 114
the Third Restatement of Trusts explicitly authorizes modification of
“administrative or distributive” provisions because of circumstances not
anticipated by the settlor. 115 The Uniform Trust Code and the Third
Restatement of Property both provide broad authority to modify trust
instruments to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives. 116
Although trust modification provides a mechanism for adapting to
circumstances the settlor could not have anticipated, modification has
one critical drawback: cost. Unless all trust beneficiaries consent,
modification requires a judicial proceeding. 117 Although a trustee might
be entitled to modify or terminate a trust without judicial approval if all
beneficiaries consent, 118 two factors make it unlikely that many trustees
will modify without a judicial imprimatur. First, in any trust of
considerable duration, some of the trust beneficiaries are likely to be
Id. at 92.
Id. at 95.
114 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66, Reporter’s Notes cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2003) (indicating that commentary on provisions of the Restatement (Second) and its
illustrations “indicate that the rule of ‘equitable deviation’ applies only to administrative
provisions”).
115 Id. § 66(1). See generally Reid Kress Weisbord, Trust Term Extension, 67 FLA. L. REV. 73,
90–91 (2015) (discussing liberalization of trust modification rules).
116 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative document may be modified, in a manner that does not violate
the donor’s probable intention, to achieve the donor’s tax objectives.”); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 416 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 explicitly requires judicial approval when the
trustee does not obtain the consent of the beneficiaries; even without such an explicit provision,
no sensible trustee would unilaterally modify a trust over the objection of trust beneficiaries
who could then sue for breach of fiduciary duty.
118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 does not explicitly require judicial approval when
the beneficiaries of a trust all consent to termination; indeed, a comment to the section
provides that “[i]f the beneficiaries can compel termination or modification of a trust under
this Section, it is not necessary that they obtain a court decree directing or authorizing
termination or establishing the modification.” Id. cmt. a.
112
113
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unborn or under the age of majority—making consent impossible or
impractical. 119 Second, because the trust beneficiaries can terminate by
consent only when termination would not impair a material purpose of
the settlor, conservative trustees might seek judicial approval to
preclude any subsequent breach of fiduciary duty action by a beneficiary
who might later claim that modification impaired one of the settlor’s
material purposes. 120
B.

Decanting and the Risk of Trustee Error

Decanting emerged as an alternative to the two options available to
the trustee and beneficiaries at common law: adhere to potentially
obsolete trust language, or seek judicial modification with its attendant
costs. Decanting statutes attempt to capture the probable intent of the
settlor in three ways. First, decanting statutes place the decision to
decant in the hands of the trustee—the party the trust settlor “trusted”
to act in the interest of the trust beneficiaries. Second, decanting statutes
cabin the trustee’s authority to reduce the risk that the trustee will stray
from the settlor’s intent. Third, in most, but probably not all
jurisdictions, the decanting power is subject to scrutiny for breach of
fiduciary duty.
Nevertheless, even with these protections in place, the risk remains
that exercise of the decanting power will frustrate rather than effectuate
the intent of the settlor. Although the risks are greatest with the more
extreme statutes like those enacted in Nevada and South Dakota, the
risks are significant even under the Uniform Act.
If a trust settlor expressly confers decanting power or its equivalent
on the trustee, the settlor has made her intent clear, and if the only issue
were intent effectuation, courts should give effect to the decanting
provision. But the Uniform Act—like other decanting statutes 121—
119 A trustee could seek appointment of a guardian to represent the interests of beneficiaries,
but that itself adds cost to the modification process, without assuring that the guardian would
in any event consent to the modification. See generally id. cmt. b (noting that as a practical
matter, guardians, who are fiduciaries, may be reluctant to consent on behalf of their wards
“whenever more is involved than mutually beneficial modification of administrative
provisions”).
120 The Restatement would protect trustees from such actions by treating beneficiary
consent as an effective waiver of all future claims. See id. cmt. a (“[If it] turns out that the action
was contrary to a material purpose of the trust . . . , the consenting beneficiaries may not hold
the trustee liable for damages resulting from action taken by the trustee before becoming aware
of the impropriety.”). A trustee might not, however, be willing to rely on the language,
especially because the Restatement comment would recognize an exception when the trustee’s
action “was not taken reasonably and in good faith.” Id.
121 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 55-2-15 (2012), which grants decanting power “[u]nless
the terms of the governing instrument expressly provide otherwise.” The statute also provides,

STERK.38.6.2 (Do Not Delete)

2020

7/6/2017 7:17 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1993

presumes that the settlor would have wanted the trustee to have
decanting power even when the instrument itself is silent on the issue. 122
Why make decanting the default rule when a settlor could easily have
opted into a decanting regime? The only plausible answer is that, until
recently, the decanting alternative had not occurred to most lawyers
who drafted trust instruments. That answer is not entirely satisfactory,
because trust lawyers have historically found countless ways to confer
discretion on trustees to take a variety of out-of-the-ordinary actions.
But even if one accepts the proposition that trust lawyers should not
have been expected to consider express language authorizing decanting,
the question remains: Why conclude that the trustee’s judgment about
settlor’s intention is superior to the instructions settlor expressed in the
trust instrument?
The answer must rest on the settlor’s limited foresight. The number
of future events that might affect the settlor’s preferences is large,
especially if the trust is to endure for a substantial period of time.
Accounting for all of them in the trust instrument would require first,
imagination to contemplate all of those potential events and second, a
commitment of resources to reduce each of the contingencies, and the
settlor’s preferred consequences, to writing. 123 When the risk that a
particular event will occur is sufficiently small, it will not be worth the
settlor’s while to consider and specify the consequences that should flow

however, that the exercise of the decanting power “is not prohibited . . . by a provision in the
governing instrument that prohibits amendment or revocation of the trust.” Id. § 55-2-15(8). In
other words, a settlor would have to explicitly prohibit decanting in order to make the statute
inapplicable—even though the settlor might have established the trust when decanting was
uncommon or even unknown.
122 The statute provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in a first-trust
instrument, . . . the terms of the first trust are deemed to include the decanting power.” UNIF.
TRUST DECANTING ACT § 4(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). The statute goes on to provide that
a trustee may not exercise the decanting power when the original trust instrument expressly
prohibits the exercise of the decanting power. Id. § 15. Like the South Dakota statute, the
Uniform Act provides that “[a] general prohibition of the amendment or revocation” of the
initial trust does not preclude exercise of the decanting power. Id.
123 These difficulties are not unique to trusts. The contracts literature has long recognized
that these difficulties lead parties to write incomplete contracts. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2005)
(“[P]erfect foresight is infinitely costly, so that, as the economic literature on contract
interpretation emphasizes, the costs of foreseeing and providing for every possible contingency
that may affect the costs of performance to either party over the life of the contract are
prohibitive.”); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 289, 289 (2006). For recognition that the same difficulties afflict the drafting of trust
instruments, see Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1179 (2013) (noting that it would be impossible for
most donors to anticipate every potential contingency that might arise over the lifetime of a
trust).
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from that event. Specification costs will be too high relative to the
benefits of specification. 124
When parties to a contract face high specification costs, the
optimal solution for both parties will often be to leave open terms with
the expectation that courts will fill in those terms in the process of
interpretation. 125 Judicial interpretation entails costs: the cost of
litigation, and the possibility that courts will fail to capture the terms the
parties would have made explicit if they had specified terms more
completely. 126 Parties will incur these costs when the cost of
specification is greater than the probable cost of committing the issue to
judicial interpretation. To adapt a formula from Judge Posner, let x be
the cost of negotiating and drafting a provision to deal with a particular
issue, let p be the probability that the issue will arise, let y be the
litigation or other dispute resolution cost to the parties, and let e be the
expected costs associated with decision-maker “error” in interpreting
the contract. 127 Contract parties will avoid specification when
x > p (y + e)
When the settlor of a trust faces high specification costs, the
settlor’s options are somewhat different. Because the trust does not
involve a “meeting of the minds” between two parties, 128 the settlor need
not rely on a potentially adversarial dispute resolution process to resolve
low probability events. Instead, the settlor can confer discretion about
how to deal with these events on a person of her choosing—either a
trustee or a third party to whom the settlor might give a power of
appointment. To borrow again from the contract formula, one would
expect the settlor to delegate decisions when
x >pe

124 See Daniel B. Kelly, Trust Term Extension: An Economic Analysis, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 85,
94 (2015).
125 See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 823 (2006) (“[T]he parties should continue to invest in contracting costs until the
marginal cost of further investment exceeds the marginal benefit in incentive gains.”).
126 Id. at 825–34.
127 See Posner, supra note 123, at 1583–84. Judge Posner considers the social costs of
interpretation, which include the costs to the judiciary of interpreting the contract. The parties
themselves, however, would include only private costs, not the costs borne by the public at large
in the form of judicial salaries.
128 Of course the trust is, at bottom, a contract between the settlor and the trustee and
therefore does require a meeting of minds between the settlor and the trustee. See Langbein,
supra note 14, at 650–60. However, the trustee is not likely to object to the terms the settlor
creates, so long as the trustee is adequately compensated.
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Because delegation to a trustee or other third party does not
typically entail litigation costs, and because the settlor can choose the
decision-maker (so long as the decision-maker is willing to accept
responsibility), one might expect delegation to be an attractive option in
almost any case where specification costs are high. Practice bears out
that expectation: trust settlors commonly create discretionary trusts of
various stripes and powers of appointment.
Decanting, however, operates outside the realm in which the settlor
conferred discretion on the trustee. Decanting statutes—including the
Uniform Act—authorize the trustee to depart from the settlor’s terms
even when the limited delegation in the trust instrument does not
authorize the departure. 129 But in those cases where the settlor chose not
to delegate, one might reasonably conclude that the settlor has made the
determination that
x <pe
In other words, one might conclude that the decision not to delegate
reflects a preference that the settlor’s express terms be honored.
The most plausible response is that the settlor’s failure to delegate
more broadly reflects not a conscious decision, but the failure of the
settlor (and the settlor’s lawyers) to understand the available options.
Assume those are the facts. The response leads to no inference at all.
Now the trust instrument itself sheds no light on whether the settlor
would have wanted the trustee to be able to alter the terms of the trust
by decanting into another trust. Decanting statutes nevertheless operate
on the assumption that any settlor who conferred one form of discretion
on the trustee would have wanted the trustee to have broader discretion.
For that to be true, we must make one of two assumptions. The first
alternative is that the settlor has concluded that x >pe for every potential
situation that might arise. The second alternative is that the settlor has
given no thought to specification, but the trustee’s post hoc judgment
always reflects a better approximation of the settlor’s intent than the
language the settlor included in the trust instrument.
Both of these assumptions ultimately rest on the premise that the
risk of trustee error in ascertaining the settlor’s intent is small. 130 Agency
129 As indicated above, section 14 of the statute withholds the decanting power only when
the trust instrument expressly excludes the power to decant. UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 14
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
130 The assumption that x is always large is implausible in light of the broad range of
changes a trustee can make through an exercise of the decanting power. Decanting statutes
explicitly authorize decanting in situations where a reasonable settlor (aided by a competent
lawyer) could have anticipated a contingency and drafted for it. For instance, the Uniform Act
authorizes the trustee to change trustee succession provisions, or to divide a trust into separate
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costs, however, cast doubt on that premise. First, even if we assume that
the trustee acts as the settlor’s agent, the trustee is not ultimately
answerable to the settlor, who will often be dead at the time the trustee
decides whether to decant. 131 The trustee is answerable instead to the
current and future beneficiaries, whose interests may or may not align
with the settlor’s preferences. As a result, the trustee’s economic
interests may lie with satisfying the beneficiaries rather than effectuating
settlor intent. Second, some decisions the trustee might make—
particularly the decision to extend the duration of the trust, or to change
its administrative provisions, or to add trust protectors or advisors—
have the potential to increase the trustee’s fees or reduce the trustee’s
risk of liability. 132 These agency costs may lead the trustee to depart
from outcomes the settlor would have preferred.
Nevertheless, if evaluated exclusively from the standpoint of settlor
intent, some circumstances present a strong case for decanting.
Consider in particular changes in law—especially tax law—that have the
potential to reduce the tax bill for all of the trust beneficiaries. Changes
in law are difficult to anticipate and provide for, so specification costs
are typically high. At the same time, Robert Sitkoff and Max
Schanzenbach have demonstrated that tax minimization is a prime
concern for most wealthy trust settlors. 133 As a result, there appears to
be little risk of error in a trustee’s decision to take advantage of a change
in tax law that benefits all of the trust beneficiaries. 134 An example might
be moving the trust’s situs to a state that had reduced or eliminated state
income taxes on trust income. 135
The prospect of frustrating the settlor’s intent is somewhat greater
when decanting generates tax savings, but only by sacrificing the interest
trusts. See id. § 11 cmt. When a trust is to endure for any period of time, a competently drafted
trust instrument makes provisions for trustee succession, and provisions for division of a trust
into separate trusts is a common feature in many trusts.
131 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2012) provides that only a
beneficiary, a co-trustee, a successor trustee, or a person acting on behalf of a beneficiary may
enforce the terms of the trust. The settlor generally lacks standing to enforce. See id. § 94 cmt.
d(2). For criticism of the rule, see Langbein, supra note 14, at 664; Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency
Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 666–70 (2004).
132 See Weisbord, supra note 115, at 87–88.
133 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 5, at 419 (establishing that empirical study is
consistent with the proposition that “people undertake significant measures to avoid” wealth
transfer taxes); Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 93, at 2497 (concluding that tax
considerations drive the structure of donative transfers).
134 Of course, the settlor could have expressly conferred power on the trustee to make
changes in response to tax law changes, but the assumption here is that the settlor and/or her
lawyer were not aware of that alternative.
135 The Uniform Act enables the trustee to change the jurisdiction of the trust and the law
governing its administration. UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 11 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2015).
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of some trust beneficiaries. For instance, suppose a trust instrument
calls for distribution of trust principal to remaindermen at the death of a
life beneficiary. The jurisdiction has abolished or modified the Rule
Against Perpetuities in a way that would permit extension of the trust
for another generation, potentially avoiding estate and/or generation
skipping transfer taxes. Extension, however, would reduce the ability of
the named remaindermen to consume the trust principal. 136 Perhaps the
trustee could reasonably conclude that the settlor would prefer tax
savings to preserving the interest of the remaindermen, but the trustee’s
judgment might be clouded by agency costs: the trustee would generate
additional fees by maintaining the property in trust for another
generation. 137
The case for decanting is even weaker when the trustee’s changes
would not produce aggregate savings for the trust beneficiaries. For
instance, suppose the trust instrument requires the trustee to make
partial distributions of principal to a beneficiary when the beneficiary
reaches specified ages. The decanting statute authorizes the trustee to
postpone or eliminate those distributions, retaining the property in trust
for a longer period. 138 Ostensibly, the trustee who decants makes the
judgment that the settlor would not have believed the beneficiary was
ready for the distribution, or that the settlor would not have wanted the
beneficiary’s creditors to reach trust assets. Of course, the settlor could
not have foreseen all of the beneficiary’s proclivities and difficulties, but
the settlor could certainly have provided for discretionary payments if
the settlor had wanted to repose decision-making in the trustee. Indeed,
the settlor might well have provided for discretionary determinations
until the beneficiary reached the specified age. To allow the trustee to
eliminate a provision for a mandatory distribution exalts the trustee’s
judgment about what the settlor would have wanted over the settlor’s
own explicit instructions, and does so when the trustee has financial
incentives to extend the trust’s duration. By contrast, the traditional
regime, which permits judicial modification, leaves the modification
issue in the hands of judges who have no financial stake in the
modification.

136 For concerns about extending the terms of a trust to reduce the interests of named
beneficiaries, see Weisbord, supra note 115, at 99–100.
137 In some states, trustees are explicitly entitled, during each year of the trust’s duration, to
a commission based on the value of the trust corpus. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:18-25 (West
1983). In most states, the trustee is entitled to reasonable compensation. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 708 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). Reasonableness generally entitles the trustee to a
commission for each year of trust management.
138 UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 11 cmt.; id. § 19 (imposing limits on duration measured
by the applicable perpetuities period of state law governing the original trust).
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The Uniform Act, like other decanting statutes, does not
distinguish between circumstances in which there are strong indicators
that the settlor would have preferred modification and circumstances
where the evidence is more equivocal. The statute’s drafters could have
limited decanting to circumstances presenting low risk of trustee error,
but opted instead to rely on fiduciary duty as the primary device for
disciplining trustees. 139 As already noted, 140 the problem with that
approach is that it relies on litigation by beneficiaries to enforce those
fiduciary duties, and litigation costs might deter those actions. The
absence of articulated standards for evaluating the trustee’s decision to
decant exacerbates the problem; courts may be reluctant to hold a
trustee liable for conduct the statute appears to authorize.
In sum, the Uniform Decanting statute provides minimal
protection against trustee error in ascertaining the settlor’s intention.
The problem is most serious with existing trusts. If an understanding of
decanting rules becomes widespread among trust lawyers, the danger
will become smaller for new trusts. Because the right to decant is a
default rule, trust settlors who prefer not to have trustees decant can
include language in the trust instrument precluding decanting. That
brings us to the issue of the next Part: Should decanting doctrine be
concerned with more than effectuating settlor intent?
IV. DECANTING AND POLICY
Part III has assumed, to use language commonly found in trust law
cases, “the cardinal rule in trust law is that the intention of the settlor is
to be followed.”141 Given that premise, Part III demonstrated that a
broad grant of decanting authority has the potential to undermine the
settlor’s objectives.
Trust law doctrine has long recognized, however, that the focus on
the settlor’s intent has its limits. Judicial fealty to freedom of testation is
139 Id. § 4(a) (“In exercising the decanting power, an authorized fiduciary shall act in
accordance with its fiduciary duties . . . .”). The statute, however, generally protects trustees
against liability for failure to decant; the comment to section 4(b) provides that “[t]he Uniform
Trust Decanting Act does not impose a duty on the authorized fiduciary to decant,” and goes
on to provide that “an authorized fiduciary generally should not be penalized for not modifying
the terms of the trust.”
140 See supra Section II.B.4.
141 Rollins v. Rollins, 755 S.E.2d 727, 730 (Ga. 2014); see, e.g., Bacardi v. White, 463 So. 2d
218, 221 (Fla. 1985) (“[O]ne of the basic tenets for the construction of trusts is to ascertain the
intent of the settlor and to give effect to this intent.”); Morse v. Kraft, 992 N.E.2d 1021, 1026
(Mass. 2013) (“In interpreting a trust, the intent of the settlor is paramount.”); Evans v. Moyer,
2012 WY 111, ¶ 21, 282 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Wyo. 2012) (“In interpreting a trust, our primary
purpose is to determine the intent of the settlor.”).
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often accompanied by a qualifier: “[T]he goal is to determine the
settlor’s intent, which the court will effectuate if it is not contrary to law
or public policy.”142 The premise behind the qualifier is that the focus on
the settlor’s intent must sometimes give way when effectuating that
intent causes harm to others.
Decanting enables trustees to rewrite a trust’s terms to impose
externalities on non-parties to the trust. If the settlor were alive, the
settlor might well applaud the effort to avoid taxes or creditors by using
mechanisms not available when the settlor created the trust. This Part
argues that there is no persuasive policy justification for permitting the
use of decanting to achieve tax and creditor avoidance objectives not
attainable when the settlor created the trust.
In outline form, the argument starts with recognition that all trusts
have the potential to generate negative externalities. Trusts also have the
potential to realize efficiency gains. We tolerate the externalities as a way
to incentivize potential settlors to create those efficiency gains.
Decanting, however, operates after the settlor has already established the
trust. If the settlor created the trust without benefit of a particular set of
negative externalities (tax or creditor avoidance), the incentive
justification for tolerating those externalities disappears.
A.

The Social Costs and Benefits of Trusts

Both by common law and by statute, trust law doctrine has long
operated to constrain use of trusts to impose costs on third parties. The
Statute of Uses itself was designed in large measure to preclude the use
of trusts as a tax-avoidance device. 143 The long-standing American
prohibition on self-settled spendthrift trusts and the more
comprehensive English prohibition on all spendthrift trusts both
operate to limit use of trusts as a mechanism for imposing harm on
creditors. 144 Various restrictions on dead hand control by settlors,
including the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, evince concerns
with intergenerational externalities: the power of persons now dead to
frustrate the preferences of beneficiaries who are currently alive. 145
In light of the social costs trusts can generate, what reasons are
there to permit settlors to create trusts? Trusts are not an essential
142 Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Kids Hope United, Inc., 922 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ill. 2009); see also
Gilbert v. Gilbert, 350 N.E.2d 609, 610 (N.Y. 1976) (“[I]n construing an Inter vivos trust, effect
is to be given to [the settlor’s] intention unless it is contrary to public policy or law.”).
143 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
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feature of a legal system; historically, civil law countries have done
without them. Even within common law jurisdictions, trusts of personal
property played a minor role until well into the nineteenth century.
What social benefit do trusts generate to justify their continued
enforcement—and, in particular, to justify the practice of decanting,
which expands the possibility for negative externalities?
As John Langbein has demonstrated, trusts have proven valuable as
an instrument of commerce. 146 Trust law’s fiduciary duties provide
investors with off-the-rack protection for investors, ensuring that asset
managers will act in the best interest of the beneficial owners of those
assets. 147 At the same time, because trust law enables the parties to
modify default rules to meet individualized needs, the trust’s flexibility
has provided, for some enterprises, efficiency advantages over the more
highly regulated corporate form. 148
Within the realm of personal wealth management, trusts enable
settlors to avoid inefficiencies that background law would otherwise
create. The most obvious of these is the cost of probate. For many
persons of means, creating an inter vivos trust, either revocable or
irrevocable, avoids the need for trust assets to pass through the probate
process, which has historically been notorious for costs and delays
beyond those necessary to ensure smooth transition of wealth from
decedent to the decedent’s beneficiaries of choice. 149
Trusts also avoid the inefficiencies associated with legal life estates.
Historically, a wealthy landowner who wanted to divide ownership
interests over time would do so with a combination of life estates and
remainders. The resulting divided ownership created conflict over
appropriate use of the land, and also made alienability cumbersome. 150
Trusts avoid these difficulties by reposing legal title in the trustee, who
would have authority to decide on use of the land and power to transfer
title to third parties. Moreover, as intangible property has replaced land
as the primary source of wealth, the trust grew in importance because
life estates and remainders were particularly ill-suited for resources

Langbein, supra note 17.
Id. at 182.
148 Id. at 183–84. Langbein wrote when LLCs were in their infancy as an alternative to
corporate organization, but trusts remain a common form of organization in a number of
commercial areas—particularly real estate and pensions.
149 Probate avoidance became an American obsession during the 1960s, when Norman F.
Dacey’s How to Avoid Probate! became a New York Times best seller, topping even William H.
Masters and Virginia E. Johnson’s Human Sexual Response. See The New York Times Best Seller
List July 17, 1966, HAWES, http://www.hawes.com/1966/1966-07-17.pdf (last visited June 11,
2017).
150 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
146
147
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other than land; for these assets, trusts provided the primary mechanism
for dividing ownership over time. 151
Finally, trusts enable property owners to ensure competent
investment and spending management for less-than-capable trust
beneficiaries. People who have accumulated wealth may want to benefit
family members or others with less financial acumen. Outright gifts to
these beneficiaries risk premature dissipation or waste of the assets.
Moreover, a property owner might engage in less productive activity, or
more low-value consumption, if the property owner could not convey
property to beneficiaries with some assurance that the beneficiaries will
derive personal benefit from the owner’s resources. 152 That focus on
incentives to the initial owner provides the primary justification (albeit a
questionable one) for spendthrift trusts and supplemental needs trusts:
needy beneficiaries would suffer, without commensurate gain to anyone
else, if their potential benefactors could not ensure that the assets would
be used to benefit the beneficiaries themselves rather than their
creditors.
Trusts, then, are useful mechanisms. The question, then, is whether
decanting makes them even more useful, or merely increases the
opportunities for imposing external costs without generating significant
benefits. The next two Sections address that question.
B.

The Social Costs of Decanting

From the standpoint of potential users, decanting’s attraction
includes the potential to impose social costs on others—primarily
through tax avoidance and avoidance of creditor claims. And, in fact,
states that have the most liberal decanting statutes are also the states
most attractive to trust settlors who want to create perpetual trusts or
asset protection trusts. According to one survey, eight of the ten most
decanting-friendly states are also among the “top ten” states measured
by their amenability to perpetual trusts and asset protection trusts. 153
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
This focus on the initial owner’s intentions underlies the questionable justification
underlying spendthrift trusts and supplemental needs trusts. See, e.g., Broadway Nat’l Bank v.
Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882) (emphasizing the right of the founder of the trust to dispose
of assets with such restrictions “as he saw fit to impose”). By contrast, when the settlor attempts
to create a spendthrift or supplemental needs trust for his own benefit, courts have been much
more hostile. See, e.g., Cohen v. Comm’r of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 668 N.E.2d 769, 771–72
(Mass. 1996) (noting that courts have not applied spendthrift or supplemental needs analysis to
self-settled trusts).
153 Compare Oshins, supra note 62 (ranking states on decanting friendliness), with Steve
Oshins, 7th Annual Domestic Asset Protection Trust State Rankings Chart, LAW OFFICES OF
OSHINS & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. (Apr. 2016), https://media.wix.com/ugd/b211fb_d786f6cb9
151
152
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Trusts generally have the potential to avoid otherwise-applicable
taxes, but decanting exacerbates the tax avoidance problem in several
ways. Consider three examples. First, if the settlor created a
discretionary trust in her home state, and the home state’s income tax
treatment of trusts proved unfavorable, decanting allows the trustee to
relocate the trust to a jurisdiction with more favorable state income tax
treatment. 154
Second, decanting allows the trustee to reduce income taxation by
taking advantage of recent increases in the estate tax exclusion. Many
people of means have created “credit-shelter trusts” to take advantage of
the estate tax exclusions available to both spouses in a married couple. A
husband, for instance, would create a trust funded with “exclusion
amount” in the year of his death. By the terms of the trust, the trustee
would be entitled to make payments of income to his wife, and might
have discretion to make payments to a variety of beneficiaries (including
the wife and settlor’s children). The wife might have a nongeneral power
to appoint the principal by will. The goal was to make sure the property
passed through the husband’s estate (where no tax would be due), but
not through the wife’s estate, where the property might be taxed at a
high estate tax rate—if the wife’s estate exceeded the exclusion amount
in the year of her death. Legislation enacted in 2010, however,
significantly increased the size of the exclusion amount. 155 As a result,
inclusion of the property in the wife’s estate might now be
advantageous: inclusion in her estate would subject the assets to a
“stepped-up basis” which could significantly reduce income taxation on
those assets when they were sold. 156 At the same time, the increased
exclusion amount might reduce or eliminate the estate tax due at the
wife’s death. Decanting would allow the trustee to transfer the trust
assets to a new trust that gave the wife a general power of
cda4f90bf13d7ed8dae9318.pdf (ranking states on asset-protection friendliness), and Steve
Oshins, 5th Annual Dynasty Trust State Rankings Chart, LAW OFFICES OF OSHINS &
ASSOCIATES,
L.L.C.
(Oct.
2016),
https://media.wix.com/ugd/b211fb_15c05b51f6
11475b83e6aaa778c69191.pdf (ranking states on friendliness to dynasty trusts). Eight states—
South Dakota, Nevada, New Hampshire, Delaware, Tennessee, Ohio, Alaska, and Wyoming—
appear in the top ten of each list, compiled by Steve Oshins, a Nevada lawyer. The methodology
Oshins used explains some of the overlap: ten percent of the decanting score is derived from
friendliness to asset protection trusts and dynasty trusts, 22.5% of the dynasty trust score is
derived from friendliness to asset protection trusts and decanting, and 7.5% of the asset
protection score is derived from friendliness to decanting.
154 See UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 11 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015) (including
change of jurisdiction of the trust as permissible action by the decanting trustee).
155 The exclusion amount became $5,000,000, adjusted for inflation in years after 2010. 26
U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3) (2012).
156 Id. § 1014(a)(1) (providing for a stepped-up basis for property acquired from a
decedent).
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appointment, 157 avoiding capital gains taxes that would otherwise
become due on sale of the assets. 158
Third, by authorizing the trustee to extend the duration of a trust,
decanting statutes might enable the trustee to leverage the generationskipping transfer tax exemption to avoid multiple generations of estate
taxation. Consider a settlor who used the GSTT exemption to create a
trust that complied with the jurisdiction’s Rule Against Perpetuities.
That is, suppose the trust gave the trustee discretion to make payments
to the settlor’s daughter during the daughter’s lifetime, and directed that
at the daughter’s death, the remaining trust principal should be
distributed to the daughter’s issue. By creating the trust, the settlor
avoided estate taxation in the daughter’s estate. However, once the
trustee distributed the trust principal to the daughter’s children, the
property would become taxable in the estates of the children. Suppose,
however, that after the settlor created the trust, the jurisdiction
abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities (or substantially extended the
Rule’s period). Decanting might permit the trustee to distribute the trust
property to another trust that would not require distribution at the
daughter’s death, but that would instead keep the property in trust for
generations to come—avoiding estate taxation indefinitely. 159
157 Id. § 1014(b)(4) (including as property acquired from the decedent “[p]roperty passing
without full and adequate consideration under a general power of appointment exercised by the
decedent by will”).
158 An example illustrates the tax advantages decanting might generate. Suppose husband
had died in 2008, when the exclusion amount (and therefore the value of the trust) was
$2,000,000. Wife dies in 2016, when the trust assets have grown to $4,000,000. Wife has assets
of her own valued at $1,000,000. Wife would not be subject to estate tax at her death in any
event. If the trust were not decanted, the trust beneficiaries would have an income tax basis
equal to the value at the husband’s death: $2,000,000. If they were to sell the assets, they would
be liable for capital gains tax on the appreciation since the husband’s death. At the current
capital gains rate for persons in the highest tax bracket, the tax rate would be twenty percent,
generating an income tax due of $400,000. If the trustee decanted the trust into a new trust that
gave the wife a general power of appointment, the trust beneficiaries would have an income tax
basis of $4,000,000, generating no income tax if the beneficiaries immediately sold the assets.
159 Whether a trustee can safely decant to accomplish this result is not free from doubt. If
the trust is exempt from the GSTT because it was created before the 1986 enactment of the tax,
often called a “grandfathered trust,” treasury regulations make it clear that decanting would
result in loss of the GSTT exemption unless decanting was available when the trust was created.
See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(1)(ii) (1995). Even if decanting were available when the
trust was created, decanting could only extend the trust’s duration for a term equal to lives in
being or ninety years from the time of the trust’s duration. Id. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(2). See
generally William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview and
Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2010).
On the other hand, nothing in the Treasury Regulations imposes comparable restrictions on
decanting from a trust exempt from the GSTT by reason of the exemption amount provided by
26 U.S.C. § 2631 for generation-skipping dispositions made after the statute’s enactment. Many
read this omission to permit decanting into a perpetual trust without losing the GSTT
exemption. See, e.g., Culp & Mellen, supra, at 25–26; James P. Spica, A Newly Revised Post
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Decanting also enables a trustee to impose external costs on
creditors of a trust beneficiary, and potentially on the public fisc, by
decanting into a spendthrift trust or supplemental needs trust even
when the original trust’s terms would have made the trust assets fully
available to the trust beneficiary. In re Kroll 160 illustrates the
opportunities. In 1992, the settlor established a trust for the benefit of
his nineteen-month-old grandson, Daniel. 161 By the terms of the trust,
Daniel’s parents, as trustees, had discretion to make payments of
income and principal to Daniel until he reached the age of twenty-one.
At that time, income payments to Daniel became mandatory. 162 The
trust provided that principal would be distributed to Daniel in three
installments, when he reached ages twenty-five, thirty, and thirty-five. 163
Unfortunately, over time it became clear that Daniel suffered from
disabilities that were not apparent when the trust was created. 164 Five
days before Daniel reached the age of twenty-one, Daniel’s father, as
trustee, sought to decant the trust assets into a supplemental needs trust
designed to preserve Daniel’s eligibility for public assistance.165 The
court, applying New York’s decanting statute, 166 upheld the trustee’s
right to decant—preserving the $400,000 trust principal for the family,
while shifting the costs of Daniel’s care to the public at large. 167
Of course, any well-drafted supplemental needs trust permits the
beneficiary to retain eligibility for public assistance. But consider the
justification for permitting a settlor like Daniel’s grandfather to create a
supplemental needs trust for a beneficiary like Daniel. The grandfather
had no obligation to support Daniel or to provide for Daniel’s benefit. If
the settlor chose to leave money to relatives other than Daniel in order
to preserve Daniel’s eligibility for public assistance, the public fisc would
be no larger than if courts enforced a supplemental needs trust for
Daniel’s benefit. Therefore, the availability of supplemental needs trusts
encourages settlors to make provision for disabled beneficiaries without
cost to taxpayers. That justification, however, does not apply when the
trustee seeks to decant the trust into a supplemental needs trust. The
settlor has already committed the assets to Daniel’s use without the

Perpetuities Reform RAP Applicability Flowchart for Property Subject to Michigan Law, 59
WAYNE L. REV. 1347, 1370–72 (2014).
160 971 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sur. Ct. 2013).
161 Id. at 864.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(b) (McKinney 2002).
167 In re Kroll, 971 N.Y.S.2d at 864, 866.
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incentive of supplemental needs protection; decanting simply shifts the
burden of Daniel’s care from the family to the public.
C.

The Social Benefits of Decanting

From a policy perspective, the question is whether there is any
justification for enabling a trustee to decant into a new trust that
imposes externalities not generated by the initial trust. Those
justifications could sound in efficiency or in equity. From an efficiency
perspective, decanting could generate social benefits in either of two
ways. First, decanting could induce people to create benefit-generating
trusts they would not otherwise create. Second, decanting could extend
the social benefits generated by already-existing trusts. From an equity
perspective, decanting might put trusts drafted by run-of-the-mill
lawyers on the same footing as trusts drafted by cutting-edge lawyers.
Ultimately, however, none of these justifications withstands analysis.
1.

Decanting and the Incentive to Create Trusts

What effect does enactment of a decanting statute have on a
potential settlor’s incentives to create a trust? First, the primary impetus
for decanting statutes has been the desire of trustees and beneficiaries to
amend trusts already in existence. Enactment of a decanting statute can
provide no incentives to create trusts once they have already been
established. To the extent decanting generates social costs, those costs
will not be mitigated by any incentives to create beneficial trusts.
Consider, for instance, the problem in In re Kroll. 168 The settlor had
already created the trust for his grandson twenty years before the
trustees sought to decant into a new trust; decanting was unknown to
the settlor, and could not have influenced his decision to create the
trust. Structurally, the problem is identical to the problem associated
with copyright term extension: extension of an existing copyright term
provides no incentives to create new copyrighted works, but generates
the social costs associated with allowing the copyright owner to
monopolize copyrighted works for an additional period. 169

971 N.Y.S.2d 863.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“What copyrightrelated benefits might justify the statute’s extension of copyright protection? First, no one could
reasonably conclude that copyright’s traditional economic rationale applies here. The extension
will not act as an economic spur encouraging authors to create new works.”).
168
169
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Second, one might surmise that the availability of decanting would
encourage future settlors to create trusts. If decanting statutes did
nothing more than explicitly authorize the trustee to decant in certain
circumstances, the surmise might be plausible. A potential settlor (or
her lawyer) who was otherwise indifferent to creating a trust might be
enticed to do so if armed with the knowledge that the trustee could
make modifications that would enable the trust to adapt to changed
circumstances. But decanting statutes go beyond enabling the settlor to
confer decanting power on the trustee. They make decanting available as
a default rule even when the trust instrument is silent about the trustee’s
power to decant. 170 A settlor or lawyer sophisticated enough to worry
about adapting a trust to changed circumstances will have no need for a
default rule; the settlor would explicitly include decanting power in the
trust instrument.
Third, the existence of decanting is particularly unlikely to create
incentives for those potential settlors whose objectives are to realize
efficiency gains: probate cost-avoidance, efficient division of ownership
over time, and competent management of resources. A potential settlor
seeking to avoid probate costs is unlikely to eschew use of a trust merely
because the trustee will not be able to modify the trust terms in case of
an event the settlor cannot foresee. A person seeking to divide
ownership of property over time has no good alternatives to the trust,
whether or not decanting is an option. And a trust will also be the most
promising alternative for a potential settlor concerned about providing
for beneficiaries with no experience or competence at managing money;
whether the trustee has decanting power is likely to be a trivial concern
in whether to create a trust. In each of these cases, some informed
settlors might prefer that the trustee have decanting power because of
the private benefits the decanting power would create for the trust’s
beneficiaries. The absence of a decanting power, however, is unlikely to
be a deal-breaker when the issue is whether to create a trust in the first
instance.
2.

Decanting as a Mechanism to Extend the Efficiency Gains
Associated with Trusts

Even if the availability of decanting has no effect on creation of
trusts, might decanting authority increase the trustee’s ability to
generate social benefits with respect to existing trusts? Decanting may,
on occasion, enable the trustee to reduce administrative costs associated
170

See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 3(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
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with the trust. When these costs constitute deadweight losses, decanting
may generate efficiencies compared to the terms of the original trust.
For instance, a trustee with decanting power would be able to appoint
successor trustees or successor co-trustees without the expense of court
involvement. 171 Similarly, decanting would enable a trustee to
consolidate multiple smaller trusts into a single larger trust to save on
administrative expenses. 172
Outside the realm of administrative cost savings, the social benefits
of decanting are difficult to identify. Consider the social benefits
generally associated with trusts. First, trusts avoid probate costs. But the
mere creation of the trust accomplishes the probate-avoidance objective.
Decanting could potentially extend a trust to avoid probate costs for
another generation, but there is little reason to believe that decanting
would be more effective at avoiding those costs than distribution to
beneficiaries on the original trust’s schedule. Distribution to
beneficiaries would enable those beneficiaries to avoid probate costs by
creating new trusts or using other probate avoidance devices.
Second, consider the efficiency advantages of the trust as a
mechanism for dividing ownership over time. If dividing ownership
over time itself generates social benefits, the trust provides an attractive
mechanism for achieving those benefits. But what social benefits arise
from allowing an owner to divide ownership over time? The primary
benefit arises from the increased incentive for the owner to engage in
productive activity if she knows that she can use the fruits of that
activity to provide for her children and grandchildren. 173 Once the
owner knows she can use the trust to provide for the beneficiaries she
knows and cares for, the prospect of decanting to extend the trust will
have a negligible impact, if any, on the owner’s productive activity.
Third, consider the advantages that arise from professional
management of the settlor’s assets. Even without a trust, a beneficiary
could engage an investment advisor to manage assets. The trust
provides an advantage only when the settlor of the trust knows or
suspects that the trust beneficiary lacks the proclivity or skill to obtain
Id. § 11 cmt.
Id.
173 This supposed benefit is the subject of controversy. While many have argued that
allowing property owners to dispose of their property to future generations creates incentives
for industry, others have concluded that most intergenerational wealth transfers are the product
of efforts to provide for one’s own future needs in light of uncertainty. Compare Franco
Modigliani, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation
of Wealth, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 15 (1988), with Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Intergenerational Transfers
and Savings, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 41 (1988). See also Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 308 (1994) (discussing both explanations for
wealth accumulation and citing empirical evidence that at least one-fourth of national wealth
“is held as intergenerational, or bequest, savings”).
171
172
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appropriate investment advice. That advantage may be very real when
the beneficiaries are people the settlor knows. But the advantage
dissipates over time. There is little reason to believe that settlor has the
foresight to anticipate the abilities of more remote descendants, and still
less reason to assume that settlor would be in a better position than
those descendants to make decisions about the appropriate source for
investment advice. Decanting to extend the duration of the trust,
therefore, is difficult to justify as a means to ensure optimal
management of family resources. One might respond that even if the
settlor is not in a position to evaluate the investment acuity of future
beneficiaries, the trustee will be in a position to do so. But once again,
the trustee faces an agency cost problem: extending the duration of the
trust ensures more fees for the trustee, even if extending the duration is
not in the interest of the beneficiaries. 174
3.

Decanting as a Means of Leveling the Playing Field

Assume decanting generates no efficiency gains. One might argue
that it is inequitable to deprive a trust’s beneficiaries of tax-avoidance or
creditor-avoidance opportunities available to beneficiaries of other
trusts drafted by more skilled lawyers.
The first problem with this argument is one of baseline. The equity
argument proceeds on the premise that the appropriate baseline is the
group of very rich settlors and beneficiaries who have obtained the best
(and often most expensive) legal counsel. Measured against that
baseline, the beneficiaries of other trusts are at a disadvantage if the
settlor’s counsel did not foresee all of the strategies for imposing
external costs on others. But, as this Article’s introduction emphasizes,
poor people—and most middle class people—do not create trusts. And
those are the people who will bear much of the brunt of the externalities
decanting might generate. It is not at all apparent that the baseline for
measuring equity should be the one percent—or, more likely, the
fraction of the one percent—of trust settlors and beneficiaries who
obtain the best legal counsel rather than the ninety percent of
individuals who do not have the resources to create trusts.
Even if the one percent were the relevant baseline, equity provides
no basis for authorizing decanting to benefit from externality-creating
legal rules unavailable to all settlors—even those with the best legal
advice—at the time of trust creation. A blanket prohibition on

174

See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
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decanting to take advantage of such rules would create a level playing
field.
V. CONCLUSION: DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE LIMITS ON DECANTING
The last two Parts have highlighted the difficulties with according
trustees broad decanting power, both as a matter of settlor intent and as
a matter of social policy. But decanting, if appropriately cabined,
remains a valuable innovation with the potential to reduce both private
and social costs in a number of circumstances: enabling a trustee to act
without judicial intervention in order to consolidate or divide trusts, or
to provide for trustee succession, saves money for all trust beneficiaries
without imposing external costs. The problem is not with decanting as a
concept, but with the expansive scope its proponents advocate.
There is no unique path to preserving the benefits of decanting
while minimizing disruption of a settlor’s distributive scheme and
limiting the potential for imposing external costs on taxpayers and
creditors. One approach would be to limit the range of actions a trustee
could take through decanting. To take a few examples, a decanting
statute could explicitly prohibit extension of trust duration, change in
the situs of the trust, and introduction of spendthrift provisions.
There are, however, two practical problems with this strategy. First,
decanting statutes are typically drafted by practicing lawyers who, quite
understandably, have their clients’ interests in mind when they draft;
their clients are trustees and beneficiaries, not creditors and general
taxpayers. As a result, more care goes into ensuring that decanting does
not inadvertently trigger increased tax liability 175 than into safeguarding
the interests of creditors and taxpayers. Second, jurisdictional
competition for trust business, in this area as in others, makes it difficult
for states to resist enacting decanting-friendly statutes. 176
Another strategy deals directly with the social costs of decanting:
federal legislation that changes eligibility rules for Medicaid and other
public assistance programs—amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
to eliminate the tax advantages of decanting. This approach would avoid
the problem of jurisdictional competition, but would be plagued by the

175 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT § 11 cmt. (noting that the statute’s prohibition on
decanting into a trust that makes a remainder beneficiary of the first trust into a current
beneficiary of the second trust is designed to avoid transforming a non-grantor trust into a
grantor trust for tax purposes). See generally Blattmachr et al., supra note 35, at 159–60
(discussing the same issue).
176 See Sterk, supra note 4, at 1065–74 (discussing incentives for states to ignore out-of-state
externalities when considering changes in trust law).
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usual interest-group politics problem that stifles tax reform
legislation. 177
Implementing a sensible approach to decanting will not be easy.
My objective is not to provide a road map, but instead to identify and
analyze issues that have received too little attention. Decanting, despite
its attraction, is no panacea. Recognition of that fact is long overdue.

177 For a recent discussion, see Susannah Camic Tahk, Public Choice Theory and Earmarked
Taxes, 68 TAX L. REV. 755, 757–61 (2015) (discussing the dynamics of tax reform legislation, in
which interest groups typically work to increase possibilities for tax avoidance).

